Agriculture and Rural Development
The MENA Economies Situated at important crossroads between Africa, Asia, and Europe, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) form one of the largest groups of developing countries in the world economy.
1 Also, with the initiation in recent years of a peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbors the region has increasingly moved to the foreground of the world economy, as private businessmen and public officials in the region have begun to look more earnestly to the region's potential for enjoying higher sustained growth and greater economic development.
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Although MENA includes a number of oil-rich countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates, it comprises mainly middle-income developing countries whose per capita income levels and economic performance, including in regard to indicators of social welfare, fall appreciably below the mean levels of countries in other regions at similar rungs of the development ladder globally (Tables 1 and 2 ). Moreover, the circumstances and lackluster economic performance of the populous low-to-lower-middle-income countries in MENA --Iraq, Syria, and Yemen in the Middle East, and Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan in North Africa --are the subject of considerable international concern, including as measured by large shipments of international food aid to some prominent MENA countries. The countries comprising MENA are indicated in the tables accompanying this section. In the main, the countries are those specified in the World Bank's World Development Report series, with the addition of four countries: Cyprus and Turkey in the Middle East, and Mauritania and Sudan in North Africa.
2 Fischer et al. (1993) , for instance, estimate that reduced military expenditures in the Middle East would release productive resources amounting to about 10 percent of GDP per annum and yield an increase in economic growth of 1-to-2 percentage points in the countries of the region. See also Fishelson (1989) and Fischer (1993) . 3 In 1993, Egypt received international food aid shipments of cereals amounting to nearly 500 thousand metric tons, followed by Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan with shipments of between 200 and 250 thousand tons each. See FAO (1994) .
Notwithstanding the prominence of petroleum in the region, agriculture remains important to most economies in MENA. Agricultural and rural populations still account for 40-to-60 percent of inhabitants in the MENA countries and for a substantial share of aggregate employment, belying the often much lower recorded share of agriculture in gross domestic output. 4 Thus, the livelihood and social welfare of the largest segments of the populations of the MENA countries are still deeply rooted in agriculture and the rural economy. And as a consequence, like in most less developed countries worldwide, agriculture and rural development have potentially significant --and mutually reinforcing --roles to play in achieving higher sustained growth and economic development in MENA.
For the last decade or more, however, many MENA countries have failed to achieve positive growth on a per capita basis (Table 2 ). This observation applies particularly to such populous countries as Iran and Syria in the Middle East and Algeria in North Africa. 5 Although agricultural growth has widely kept pace with general economic growth in MENA, agriculture in less developed countries must grow by 2-to-3 percentage points above the rate of population growth in order to contribute significantly to not only national economic growth but also rural development and welfare. By this rule of thumb, the lackluster performance of the MENA economies is discernibly mirrored in the less than robust performance of the agricultural sector.
Agriculture and Economywide Policies in Economic Development
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That agriculture can contribute significantly to the transition of many if not most less 4 The share of agriculture in low-income and middle-income developing countries is often biased downward by the economic policy related repression of prices for agricultural commodities in these countries. Thus, the contribution of agriculture to total employment in such countries is frequently a more reliable indicator of the economic importance of agriculture to the national economy. 5 It is likely that the availability of reliable data on economic growth during 1980-93 for more countries in MENA would reveal that additional countries in the Middle East and North Africa experienced negative per capita growth rates during the last decade. 6 The subsection draws heavily on Bautista and DeRosa (1996) .
developed countries to higher levels of growth and economic development is a pertinent and insightful theme developed by, among others, Johnston and Mellor (1961) , Mellor (1966; 1995) , and Johnston and Kilby (1975) . 7 More specifically, this theme contends that sustained industrial development and economic growth in low-to-middle-income countries requires policies for economic development that yield incentives for efficient expansion of not only industry but also agriculture and the rural sector, despite the expected long-term decline in the relative importance of agriculture in growing economies.
Increases in agricultural output stimulate the demand for industrial inputs such as fertilizer and farm equipment ("backward linkage") as well as expand the supply of agricultural goods used as inputs to nonagricultural production ("forward linkage"). Agricultural crop and livestock production is generally characterized by a "weak" backward linkage and "medium-strong" forward linkage (Hirschman 1958:110) .
Agricultural growth, however, also raises the real income of farm households and hence their demand not only for food and other agricultural products but also, and likely more so, for industrial goods and services. For instance, Mellor and Lele (1973) and, more recently Ranis, Stewart, and Reyes (1989) , show that such "consumption linkage" effects are critical to the influence of agricultural growth on the overall growth performance of the rural and national economy. In particular, a wider sharing of agricultural income growth among rural households leads to a greater incremental consumption demand for the labor-intensive products of rural industries.
Rural industry growth in turn provides "additional impetus for further increases in agricultural productivity, leading to a mutually supportive cycle of agricultural and industrial growth" (Ranis and Stewart 1987:140) .
7 Also see Johnson (1995) for a general discussion of the appropriate role of government in agriculture and rural development in more developed countries as well as less developed countries. For a recent analysis of the strategic impacts on growth and other economic variables that improved agricultural
Beyond the reinforcing effects on industrialization and economic growth, broadly based agricultural growth has significant "spillover" effects that go to the heart of improving social welfare as part of the development process. Because poor households in most low-income countries reside mainly in rural areas, economic development strategies that recognize the importance of ensuring agricultural and rural development along with industrialization offer the promise of reducing poverty directly and, more generally, the disparity of access in rural areas relative to urban areas to social services, such as education and health-care. Such development strategies can also be expected to increase access to many privately-provided services, such as banking and retailing of consumer goods, in rural areas.
Particularly inhibiting greater contribution by agriculture to sustained economic growth and rural development are inappropriate economic regimes governing trade and macroeconomic policies, or so-called economywide policies, in many less developed countries. These regimes have given rise to what has been termed the "bias against agriculture."
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As most often manifest in importsubstitution policies and pursuit of inflationary monetary and fiscal policies (under fixed exchange rates), these regimes tend to distort the real exchange rate between nontraded and traded goods and, consequently, to distort price incentives against agriculture, with the frequent objective of promoting more rapid industrialization. This causes agriculture and other exportable goods sectors, including the small-scale rural enterprise sector, to be smaller and less internationally competitive than otherwise, and accordingly causes exports of agricultural and other labor-intensive goods to be lower than they would be under more neutral and open policy regimes. As emphasized by Bautista and Valdés (1993) , the bias against agriculture also causes the purchasing power of rural populations to be lower than otherwise, adding to the demand-side constraint on economic growth in performance would have in Egypt under economic policy reforms, see John Mellor Associates et al. (1995) . 8 See Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés (1988, 1992) and Bautista and Valdés (1993) for in-depth case studies involving a wide range of countries, including selected countries in MENA.
less developed countries.
In sum, more even-handed policies towards agriculture and the rural sector, associated with greater equality of access to economic opportunities, physical infrastructure, and social-service facilities in rural areas, 9 should be expected to result in greater agricultural and rural incomes, increasing the effective demand for manufactured producer and consumer goods. Such policies might also be expected to promote rural small-scale industries that can meet part of the industrial needs of agriculture while also significantly adding to the employment of the rural labor force.
Finally, increased national food security (achieved through either increased domestic production of food staples or increased food imports financed by higher export earnings) and reduced pace of urbanization represent two additional social benefits of more neutral government policies in less developed countries.
Greater dynamism in agriculture led by expanded trade is required to achieve higher sustained economic growth and greater rural development in MENA. The remainder of this paper explores this issue in three sections. Section 2 considers the current commodity structure of agricultural production and trade in MENA, and investigates the comparative advantage in agriculture of the countries in the region revealed in profiles of their recent international and intraregional exports. Section 3 then considers the policy environment in which the MENA countries must look to improving their agricultural and trade performance, emphasizing especially the structure of protection in MENA countries that gives rise to the bias against agriculture in the region. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the conclusions of the paper and provides some final remarks on the importance of agricultural trade for increasing rural development and welfare in the Middle East and North Africa. 9 The importance of physical and social infrastructure for agricultural growth and rural development in low-income countries is reviewed recently by Ahmed and Donovan (1992) . In the context of MENA, among the most important aspects of the social infrastructure to the region, in addition to individual countries, is the efficient development and utilization of limited water resources. See, for instance, World
Production, Trade and Comparative Advantage Agricultural Production
Agriculture in MENA has a long recorded history, rivaling that of Western Civilization. In fact, the region is the center of origin of the cultivation of wheat, barley, lentils, and chickpeas, and the domestication of sheep and goats. Though fertile areas are found in MENA along the Euphrates, Nile, and other rivers and tributaries, the region is characterized by low and erratic rainfall, limited arable land, some of the world's largest and harshest deserts, and limited water resources for irrigation (Nordblom, Goodchild, and Shomo 1995) . Along with the preferences of inhabitants for a Mediterranean diet rich in cereal starches and olive oil (Spiller 1991) , the physical characteristics of the region go along ways toward determining the composition of MENA agricultural production and trade. Table 3 provides an overview of agricultural production in MENA during 1990-92. 10 In the aggregate, agricultural production in the region, about 230 million tons, is comparable to that in Southeast Asia (262 million tons), Sub-Saharan Africa (270 million tons), and the Southern Cone of Latin America (302 million tons). However, it amounts to only a small share (5 percent) of world output, and is dwarfed by agricultural production in China, South Asia, and the major industrial countries. The largest agricultural producing countries in MENA are Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq in the Middle East and Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan in North Africa.
Three-quarters of agricultural production in MENA is devoted to two product categories: cereals (38 percent) and fruits and vegetables (38 percent). Meat and dairy products --chiefly milk Bank (1995b) . 10 The discussion here focuses solely output volumes of major crops and other agricultural products, including meats and dairy products. Important considerations for the utilization of arable lands and pastures, production yields, and production input requirements are beyond the scope of the present analysis. For more in-depth review of agriculture and farm systems in the Middle East and North Africa, see, for instance, Nordblom, Goodchild, and Shomo (1995) . See also Khaldi (1984) .
(9 percent) and poultry (1 percent) --account for about 12 percent of total output, followed by roots and tubers (6 percent) and sugar (2 percent). 11 Wheat is the dominant cereal crop. Barley is the second largest cereal crop in the region, and, in fact, it is produced in larger quantities in MENA than all other developing regions combined. In a similar vein, fruits and vegetables, which tend to be relatively high-valued products, command a larger share of total agricultural output in MENA than in all other regions of the world.
For each commodity group, the largest quantities produced by individual MENA countries are highlighted using bold typeset in Table 3 . Typically, the seven largest agricultural producing countries are also the largest producers in each commodity group. For instance, Iran is among the top one-third MENA countries producing meat and dairy products, wheat and other cereals, fruits and vegetables, and so forth. What is more noteworthy that three smaller agricultural producing countries stand out among the major producers in certain commodities groups. First, Israel is among the top MENA producers of fruits and vegetables (2,975 million tons). Second, Saudi
Arabia is among the top producers of cereals (4,501 million tons) and especially wheat (3,894 million tons). And third, Algeria is among the top producers of meat and dairy products (1,570 million tons), wheat (1,422 million tons), and barley (1,350 million tons).
The composition of agricultural production varies appreciably from country to country, for fundamental climatic and geographic reasons. In several small-size Middle East countries along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean (Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon), production of fruits and vegetables tends to "dominate" production of cereals, whereas the distribution of production between the two categories of agricultural products tends to be more balanced in most other MENA countries. Also, production of irrigation-intensive crops, such as rice and sugar, is limited 11 Among other major agricultural crops and products are pulses (2 percent), cotton and sunflower seeds (1 percent), and natural fibers and other agricultural raw materials (1 percent).
to three countries with prime access to the waters of the Euphrates and Nile: Iran, Turkey, and
Egypt.
Finally, it should be emphasized that agricultural production in MENA is concentrated mainly in staple foods and some higher-valued food crops (i.e., fruits and vegetables).
Comparatively little production of agricultural raw materials, such as natural fibers and animal hides and skins, takes place.
Foreign Trade
The merchandise trade of Middle East and North Africa countries amounts to between 15 percent (based on exports) and 18 percent (based on imports) of GDP (see Table 1 ). This 
and Intraregional Trade:
where Xj(i,.) represents exports of commodity j by country i to the world (w) or MENA (m), Xj(w,.) represents exports of commodity j by the world (that is, exports of the commodity by all competing producers) to the same two markets, and TX(i,.) and TX(w,.) represent total exports of all commodities by country i and the world, respectively. Broadly speaking, RCA values greater than unity indicate comparative advantage, and RCA values less than unity indicate comparative disadvantage.
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International Trade
The exceptional comparative advantage in crude petroleum of the majority of countries in the Middle East and North Africa is apparent in the computed RCA statistics in 
Intraregional Trade
The intraregional RCA statistics gauge the competitiveness of the MENA countries as exporters to one another. As might be expected, the competitiveness of the MENA countries as suppliers of not only crude petroleum but also light manufactures is reduced, reflecting the similarity of mineral fuel deposits and labor resources in most MENA countries. Of greater interest here is the evidence that the MENA countries have appreciable intraregional comparative advantage in agriculture, led in particular by strong comparative advantage in livestock, meats, and dairy products, and fruits and vegetables. This may reflect not only some sharp differences in agricultural resources and production capabilities between the MENA countries but also natural barriers to trade with countries outside MENA, including transportation and handling costs, and general or possibly religious preferences of consumers for regional varieties of agricultural products. 15 In sum, under current economic and other circumstances the comparative advantage of most countries in the Middle East and North Africa differs depending upon whether their exports are destined for world markets or markets in neighboring countries. 
Trade Regimes and the Bias against Agriculture
Multilateral Trade Liberalization
The previous section demonstrated that although agriculture in MENA is not broadly competitive in international markets, particular subsectors of agriculture in many MENA countries are competitive, both internationally and intraregionally. Under such circumstances, improvement of the international terms of trade for agriculture resulting from the milestone, albeit modest,
Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture should be expected to benefit the agricultural and rural economies of the MENA countries that have sizable agricultural sectors and rural populations.
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15 DeRosa (1995b) finds similar differences between computed international and intraregional values of revealed comparative advantage for the MENA countries during 1987-89. Moreover, he finds that the differences between the two sets of RCA values are statistically significant for most MENA countries, based on the results of a rank correlation analysis. 16 While this finding holds possible implications for the formulation of policies governing the multilateral versus regional relations of MENA countries, it does not provide guidance to the relative benefits of pursuing one set of economic relations over the other. DeRosa (1995b) provides an exploratory investigation of the relative benefits of expanding intraregional versus international trade in staple food commodities. Other recent studies have investigated the merits of closer economic relations between MENA countries and the European Union, with limited focus on the economic impacts on agricultural production and trade. See, for instance, Rutherford, Rutstrom, and Tarr (1993 ), Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1995 ), and Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1996 . 17 At the same time, higher prices for food commodities should be expected to place a burden on food-importing countries in MENA. However, the impacts of the Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture must be weighed against the impacts of other aspects of the overall Uruguay Round agreement, many of which are generally expected to be positive for less developed countries. For example, many developing countries, including in MENA, might realize higher export earnings from the multilateral liberalization of trade in non-food agricultural sectors and manufacturing sectors such as textiles and apparel. For an overview of the Uruguay Round agreement and its implications for agriculture and other sectors in less developed countries, see Martin and Winters (1996) and Hathaway and Ingco (1996) .
Two recent studies have attempted to assess the broad implications of the Uruguay Round agreement for the Middle East and North Africa countries. The first, a partial equilibrium analysis by Yeats (1996) , estimates that the liberalization of trade regimes in the European Union, Japan, and United States under the agreement will expand Middle East exports by $800 million annually.
Unfortunately, the study does not indicate the magnitude of the underlying impacts on agricultural production and exports by Middle East countries.
The second study is a compendium devoted to the implications of the Uruguay Round for Arab countries, edited by El-Naggar (1996) . It includes an analysis by Goldin and Kherallah (1996) focused specifically on the Uruguay Round's impacts on agriculture in MENA.
Unfortunately, the analysis provides little by way of quantitative estimates of the expected impacts on agricultural production or trade. Nonetheless, it usefully relates econometric estimates of the impacts of the Uruguay Round agreement on international prices of agricultural products to the principal agricultural exports of eight MENA countries classified as oil exporters (Algeria and Saudi Arabia), diversified exporters (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Syria), and primary commodity exporters (Sudan). The findings point to potential gains to agricultural producers in several of the countries considered, especially producers of fruits and vegetables and natural fibers but also producers of vegetable oils, meats, and grains (except rice). However, in interpreting their findings Goldin and Kherallah emphasize that, to be realized, the expected gains for MENA agriculture must be accompanied by reforms to economywide trade and macroeconomic policies in order to ensure that the higher international prices for agricultural products are received by farmers. 
Protection in MENA
The last point brings to the fore the issue of the repression of agriculture in MENA by inappropriate economywide policies. Despite the importance of agriculture and, more generally, the rural economy in the region, protection from imports of manufactures and other products remains high in many countries in the Middle East and North Africa, contributing significantly to overvaluation of the real exchange rate (the relative price of nontraded goods to traded goods), and thereby to repression of domestic relative prices in subsectors of agriculture in MENA that are internationally competitive. Table 6 indicates the magnitude of protect ion during the last decade in the MENA countries for which data on import tariffs and nontariff barriers (NTBs) are available. The most open countries in MENA are the high-income Persian Gulf countries (Kuwait and Saudia Arabia), with average tariff rates not exceeding about 10 percent and average NTB rates not exceeding about 5 percent. Most other countries in the region are inward-looking, with average tariff rates widely exceeding 20 percent and average NTB rates widely exceeding 30 percent. This is true of low-income countries such as Egypt and Sudan, but also middle-income countries such as Algeria, Iran, and Turkey. The high nontariff barriers are particularly costly in economic terms 19 The discussion here focuses on protection in output markets for agricultural and other products. Although protection for production inputs is also important, estimates of effective rates of protection are beyond the scope of the present analysis. Notably however, computed effective rates of protection are often highly correlated with nominal rates of protection.
because, unlike ad valorem tariffs, nontariff barriers limit the extent to which the price system allocates resources among alternative uses. They also tend to be associated with discretionary administered systems for authorizing imports that encourage "socially unproductive" rent-seeking activities. 20 Finally, it should be noted that such extensive reliance on administered protection is similar mainly to the broad enforcement of NTBs at high frequency rates in the low-income countries of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Erzan et al. 1989; DeRosa 1992) .
In the more open trade regimes of East Asia, administered protection is enforced much more selectively and at much lower average frequency rates (e.g., DeRosa 1988 DeRosa , 1995a .
The MENA countries tend to enforce higher rates of protection for manufactures, especially light manufactures comprising the category of other manufactures in Table 5 , than for traditionally internationally-competitive subsectors of agriculture such as agricultural raw materials. This structure of protection is a fundamental determinant of the bias against agriculture, distorting domestic price incentives in favor of shifting resources to production of nontraded goods and import-competing manufactures.
The MENA countries also tend to enforce high rates of protection for food, frequently by administered protection measures that include state trading. This protection reflects national concerns for food security, and it is often enforced in conjunction with direct controls on domestic food prices. 21 However, efforts to achieve food security and especially food self-sufficiency drain resources from more internationally competitive subsectors of agriculture. Considerations for comparative advantage suggest that expanded production and exports in the internationally competitive subsectors of not only agriculture but also industry and other natural resource-based sectors would increase national food security more than protection of inefficient domestic food 20 On the economics of rent-seeking and so-called directly unproductive profit-seeking activities, see Tullock (1967 Tullock ( , 1980 , Krueger (1974), and Bhagwati (1982) . 21 producers, by providing foreign exchange earnings for increased imports of food at lower domestic resource cost.
Finally, it is noteworthy that some MENA countries, such as Algeria and Tunisia, have significantly reformed their trade regimes during the last decade, succeeding particularly in reducing their average levels of administered protection. These reforms should be expected to improve export performance. To the extent, however, that the trade regimes of these and other MENA countries continue to protect manufacturing and other subsectors favored by the government and domestic special interests, a significant bias against agriculture will remain and continue to inhibit the potential of agriculture to contribute more significantly to domestic output and exports.
Regional Cooperation
With the commencement of a peace process in the Middle East between the Arab countries and Israel, renewed interest in the implications of closer economic relations has swept the greater MENA region and has spawned a series of regional economic summits, with the most recent summit held in Cairo, Egypt in November 1996 (Table 7) . Table 6 include processed foods as well as food primary commodities. Thus, the high rates of protection for food in Table 6 reflect protection for domestic food processing industries in addition to protection for domestic cultivation of food crops. Against the background of the "hub-and-spoke" design of the EU partnership agreements, a MENA free trade area might be viewed as necessary to ensure that incentives for not only expanded trade but also expanded investment are distributed efficiently between the MENA countries and the European Union. A MENA free trade area might also be viewed as a means of 26 Fischer (1993) sets out an early vision of the forms that economic cooperation in MENA could take to promote greater flows of trade, capital, and labor throughout the region, including the possible establishment of a regional development bank and the necessary involvement in planning cooperation efforts of both private business leaders and government officials. A similar vision is set forth in the Casablanca Declaration, the official communiqué of the 1994 MENA economic summit. 27 See Hoekman and Djankov (1996) . 28 For overview and quantitative analyses of these agreements, see Rutherford, Rutstrom, and Tarr (1993) , Page and Underwood (1996 ), Brown, Deardorff and Stern (1996 ), Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1996 ), and Togan (1996 . A compendium of studies analyzing the macroeconomic and sectoral implications of a EU partnership agreement for Egypt, among other MENA countries, is presented in Galal and Hoekman (1996) . maintaining the focus of MENA countries on their mutual economic interests, amid competing incentives for expanding relations with developing countries outside of the region --e.g., the increasing interest of Iran and Turkey in expanding their economic relations with Pakistan and the newly independent countries in Central Asia (see Table 7 ).
Economic Considerations
While inclusion of considerations for agriculture in the establishment of any future MENA economic cooperation schemes seems secure, 29 the extent of the benefits that would derive to the sector from such schemes are less certain.
Of fundamental importance for determining the implications of regional trading arrangements for both agriculture and national economic welfare is the underlying complementarity of natural and accumulated resources, including human capital, among the countries forming a free trade area. If preferential trading arrangements result in little or no improvement in the terms of trade facing agriculture in the region, then it is unlikely that the regional arrangements will substantially overcome distortions to domestic price incentives against agriculture arising from protection and other inappropriate economywide policies. A particular danger is that where countries are very similar in their (relative) resource endowments, national import substitution policies to promote industrialization or protect favored industries will essentially be replaced by regional import substitution policies that succeed in liberalizing trade between neighboring countries but result in increased protection against imports from the world's most efficient producers.
Regional trade liberalization among less developed countries most often takes the form of Ultimately, the extent to which regional trading arrangements might be counted upon to reduce the bias against agriculture is an empirical question. No quantitative studies of this issue have been undertaken for the MENA region. A recent study of the issue by DeRosa (1995a DeRosa ( , 1996 for the new free trade area among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) uses a computable general equilibrium model to trace the adjustment of key variables determining the extent of the bias against agriculture, including the real exchange rate and other relative prices. The study finds that the expected gains to agriculture and national welfare under the ASEAN Free 29 The agenda of the recent MENA economic summits have prominently included sessions on enhancing the role of agriculture in MENA, including as a priority sector for expanded growth of exports in order to promote general economic growth and rural development. See WEF (1994, 1995, 1996) . 30 As discussed previously in this section, in addition to protecting industry many developing countries also protect production of staple food commodities and processed foods. In doing so, governments distort price incentives for subsectors of agriculture that have considerable comparative advantage. Reducing high rates of protection then can lead to expansion of intraindustry trade as well as interindustry trade favoring internationally competitive subsectors of agriculture. These results suggest that agriculture might be expected to benefit in some measure from regional economic cooperation in MENA, including under schemes that would emphasize greater regional cooperation for infrastructure development, management of water resources, or other aspects of "deeper" economic integration (Lawrence 1996). However, with respect to goods markets alone, trade liberalization in MENA that encompasses trade with the European Union and the region's other principal trading partners is likely to hold the promise of substantially larger and dependably significant gains to MENA agriculture and surrounding rural economies. Moreover, this conclusion is likely to hold regardless whether the European Union or other major trading partners offer any reciprocal trade concessions, including reforms to the CAP or other tradedistorting farm policies in the major industrial countries. Essentially, so long as there is some pricesensitivity to international markets for the agricultural products and other goods exported by the MENA countries, effective reduction of the protection in these countries that gives rise to the bias against agriculture should be expected to reduce the overvaluation of real exchange rates in MENA, reallocate resources to more efficient uses in internationally competitive subsectors of agriculture and industry in the region, and stimulate greater agricultural production and exports from the region to international markets wherever they may be found abroad.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
Along with achieving higher sustainable growth and greater national economic development, accelerated rural development remains a major objective of most countries in the Middle East and North Africa, to provide not only disadvantaged groups but also other inhabitants of rural areas in MENA with higher living standards and more equitable access to the private and public services found in urban areas.
Agriculture is the nucleus of productive activities in the rural economy of most countries in On open regionalism in East Asia and the still uncertain degree of conditionality to be observed in the "nondiscriminatory" free trade area envisioned for the APEC region, see, for instance, Drysdale and Garnaut (1993) and APEC (1994) . On forms of regional economic cooperation in other developing areas, see de Melo and Panagariya (1993). Sources: USDA (1996 ), World Bank (1995a , 1995c , 1996 , and Appendix Table A1 . Notes: Education index is the secondary enrollment rate plus five times the university enrollment rate, both calculated in their respective age cohorts for the year 1989. Sources: USDA (1996 ) and World Bank (1995a , 1995c , 1996 . Notes: Economic growth rates are in real terms. 
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APPENDIX
